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Preventive War, Deterrent Retaliation, and 
Retrospective Disproportionality 
Brian Angelo Lee∗ 
ABSTRACT: The legal and moral (“just war”) permissibility of 
preventive military attacks has been one of the most urgent questions 
in international law since the onset of the War on Terror. Debates in 
this area commonly rest upon an assumption that the relevant 
strategic choice is between preventive war and deterrence, and that 
even if preventive war may be controversial, deterrence at least is 
legally straightforward and relatively unproblematic. This Article 
challenges that conventional assumption. I argue that deterrence and 
preventive war have more in common than is typically noticed—
specifically, a shared future-orientation and reliance on retrospec-
tively disproportionate violence—and that in virtue of these common 
features, much of what we say about the permissibility of one of 
these strategies we shall have to say also about the other, both under 
international law as manifested in the United Nations system and 
under contemporary “just war” arguments. Contrary to common 
assumption, deterrence offers no easy escape from the legal and 
moral concerns raised by preventive war. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington, D.C., President George W. Bush 
declared that henceforth the United States would consider 
preventive war to be among its options for addressing threats posed 
by hostile regimes abroad.1 This declaration, formalized in the 2002 
National Security Strategy document,
 
bore practical fruit in the 2003 
United States-led invasion of Iraq and continues to shape current 
debates over the proper way to respond to the threat of global 
terrorism and seemingly “rogue” regimes, such as in North Korea 
and Iran.2 
This embrace of preventive war has been highly controversial. 
Defenders of the policy assert that preventive war is sometimes 
necessary in an era of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction 
 
 1. President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military 
Academy in West Point, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 917 (June 1, 2002) [hereinafter West 
Point Speech]. 
 2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13–16 
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
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(WMD), and terrorist organizations capable of attacks anywhere in 
the world.3 Critics of the policy decry the fact that preventive war 
involves the use of military force to thwart an attack that has not yet 
occurred and perhaps never will occur. These critics consider such a 
policy to be both incompatible with international law norms and a 
reckless abandonment of the global security system that has been 
constructed at enormous human cost out of the previous centuries’ 
wars.4 
It is common to frame this debate as a choice between two 
alternatives: either preventive war or deterrence (and strategies such 
as containment and power-balancing that rely upon deterrence).5 It 
is also common to assume that, however controversial preventive 
war’s legal and moral permissibility may be, deterrence is clearly less 
problematic than preventive war.6 
This Article challenges that fundamental assumption. I argue that 
preventive war and general deterrence share certain fundamental 
features and that, by virtue of this similarity, much of what one says 
about the legal and moral permissibility of preventive war one shall 
also need to say about deterrence and related approaches. Deterrence 
 
 3. See, e.g., West Point Speech, supra note 1, at 919 (“For much of the last century, 
America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some 
cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the 
promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist 
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly 
provide them to terrorist allies.”); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 749–50 
(2004) (“A second reason to modify the use-of-force rules is that they do not address the 
recent changes in technology and political organization that pose threats to nations. The easier 
availability of weapons technology, the emergence of rogue states, and the rise of international 
terrorism have presented more immediate threats to national security than those from attack by 
other nation-states.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Neta C. Crawford, The Slippery Slope to Preventive War, 17 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 30 (2003); Jordy Rocheleau, Preventive War and Lawful Constraints on the Use of 
Force: An Argument Against International Vigilantism, in RETHINKING THE JUST WAR 
TRADITION 183, 202 (Michael W. Brough et al. eds., 2007) (“Few deaths in history can be 
traced to a failure to wage preventive war, whereas preventive wars themselves have taken 
countless lives. Although some fear the consequences of deference to international authority, 
the greatest danger to peace and justice today lies in the too-ready abandonment of law.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Editorial, In Defense of Deterrence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A24 
(arguing against discarding deterrence from America’s strategic arsenal in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks); Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 
2007, at 1, 8–10 (book review) (assessing options for addressing the threat of terrorism). See 
generally IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR 
passim (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., commentators discussed infra Part II.E. 
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thus offers no easy escape from the legal and moral concerns raised 
by preventive war. 
The implications of this conclusion are broad, since deterrence is 
an essential part of national security strategy in general, both on its 
own and as a fundamental element in strategies of containment and 
power-balancing: 
[I]t should now be apparent that deterrence is not going to 
disappear just because the Cold War is gone. It is the underlying 
basis of most prospective or plausible regimes for the management 
of regional or global security. . . . It is not simply a way of trying to 
force others to behave; it is woven into many elements of foreign 
and national security policy. For instance, deterrence in place 
remains a political prerequisite for cooperation with adversaries or 
potential adversaries—for making meaningful and risky concessions, 
pursuing “engagement,” and reaching many types of  
agreements. . . . And if we are to build successful international 
communities, general deterrence will play a role comparable to 
police protection in fostering democratic society.7 
Thus, an accurate assessment of the relative legal and moral statuses 
of deterrence and preventive war is essential. 
Part II of this Article develops the claim that general deterrence 
and preventive war have fundamental similarities that make key 
concerns about preventive war equally applicable to deterrence and 
introduces the resulting problem for claims that deterrence as a 
general security strategy is necessarily legally or morally superior to a 
strategy that includes possible recourse to preventive war. Part III 
examines in more detail how these fundamental similarities affect the 
respective statuses of deterrence and preventive war under current 
international law as embodied in the United Nations system. Part IV 
focuses on contemporary “just war” arguments against preventive 
war and concludes that those criticisms either apply equally to 
deterrence or are unpersuasive. Thus, neither under the international 
law of the United Nations system nor under contemporary “just 
war” analyses does deterrence offer a refuge from the legal and moral 
concerns raised by preventive war. Part V concludes the discussion. 
 
 7. PATRICK M. MORGAN, DETERRENCE NOW, xix (2003) (emphasis omitted); see also 
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, DETERRENCE 11, 41 (2004) (noting that “containment as an 
objective lent itself to deterrence as a method” and referring to general deterrence “in the 
guise of a balance of power”); MORGAN, supra at 87–89 (noting the role of deterrence in 
balance-of-power systems).  
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One note about scope: This Article’s discussion will focus 
exclusively on legal and moral (“just war”) issues raised by 
deterrence and preventive war. Deterrence and preventive war 
obviously have substantial practical differences in their day-to-day 
operation, and there may be compelling prudential reasons to prefer 
one over the other in individual cases or even universally. However, 
although those practical differences are important, and although 
legal and moral considerations can themselves have significant 
prudential implications, whether deterrence or preventive war 
ultimately makes for a more effective foreign policy is a question of 
statecraft that lies largely outside the scope of this Article. The 
questions at issue here will be legal and moral. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND 
PREVENTIVE WAR 
A. Preview 
What are these fundamental similarities between deterrence and 
preventive war? This Part discusses those similarities in detail, but a 
brief preview of the course of that discussion may be helpful. I argue 
first that both deterrence and preventive war share a fundamental 
future orientation—that is, they both focus primarily on averting 
future attacks rather than on responding to ongoing or past attacks. 
Moreover, as a result, both deterrence and preventive war necessarily 
rely upon retrospectively disproportionate violence. Preventive war 
does so by attacking an adversary who has made no prior attack; 
deterrence does so by responding to an adversary’s attacks with a 
level of retaliation that deliberately and substantially exceeds the size 
of the provocative attack. Since a proportionality requirement is a 
basic element of standard frameworks for regulating the use of force, 
this shared reliance on retrospectively disproportionate use of force 
raises serious questions about the extent to which deterrence really is 
less problematic than preventive war. 
B. Preliminaries 
Some definitions and distinctions will prove useful in our 
analysis. First, both “preventive war” and “preemption” are forms of 
“anticipatory self-defense”—uses of force motivated by the 
expectation or concern that the target regime will, in the future, 
perform an aggressive act in response to which the anticipating party 
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would be entitled to defend itself, even though at present the target 
has not yet performed that aggressive act. Exactly how and where to 
draw the line between preemptive and preventive forms of 
anticipatory self-defense is uncertain and somewhat controversial,8 
but the basic distinction is straightforward—the sooner or more 
certain the feared aggressive act is, the more the anticipatory 
response is “preemptive;” the more distant or uncertain the threat, 
the more the anticipatory response is “preventive.”9 
There are many definitions of deterrence, most fairly similar. 
Lawrence Freedman’s is sufficient for our purposes: “[D]eterrence is 
concerned with deliberate attempts to manipulate the behavior of 
others through conditional threats.”10 Patrick Morgan usefully 
distinguishes between immediate and general deterrence:11  
An immediate deterrence situation is one in which an actor realizes 
that another specific actor is seriously contemplating attacking and 
undertakes to deter that attack. . . . General deterrence has to do 
with anticipating possible or potential threats, often hypothetical 
and from an unspecified attacker, and adopting a posture designed 
to deter other actors from ever beginning to think about launching 
an attack and becoming the “potential” or “would-be” challengers 
so prominent in deterrence theory.12 
 
 8. See, e.g., David Luban, Preventive War, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 230 (2004) 
(advocating changing the definition of preventive war by replacing a temporal-imminence 
requirement with a probabilistic requirement). 
 9. For sheer vividness in characterizing situations of preemption, one would be hard-
pressed to improve upon a starship captain in an old TV show: “The trigger’s been pulled. 
We’ve got to get there before the hammer falls.” Star Trek: Errand of Mercy (NBC television 
broadcast Mar. 23, 1967), available at http://www.cbs.com/classics/star_trek/ (follow 
Season 1 hyperlink, go to Episode 26). (The strategic situation in that episode was, regrettably, 
described with insufficient detail for thorough analysis. Captain Kirk’s remark notwithstanding, 
the Enterprise’s actions may not have been strictly preemptive.) Note that although the 2002 
National Security Strategy document speaks in terms of “preemption,” the sorts of actions that 
it describes would more typically be called “prevention.” See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, 
supra note 2, at 13–16. In this Article, I shall follow common practice in using “prevention” 
to describe such actions. 
 10. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 6. 
 11. Because our discussion will focus almost exclusively on general deterrence, in the 
interest of economy I will routinely use the unmodified term “deterrence” to refer to general 
deterrence. If I intend a specific point to be about immediate deterrence, I will indicate that 
explicitly. 
 12. MORGAN, supra note 7, at xvi. 
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C. Future orientation 
The distinctive difference between preventive war and more 
familiar defensive uses of force is that the latter address an ongoing 
act of aggression, while the former aims at forestalling aggression 
that will occur only in the future (if at all). Fighting the German 
army north of Paris in 1940 was garden-variety defense; fighting the 
German army in the Rhineland in 1936 to impede Nazi Germany’s 
remilitarization and discourage Hitler’s expansionist ambitions 
would have been preventive war. 
However, this future orientation is not unique to preventive war; 
it is an essential feature of deterrence as well.13 Both preventive war 
and deterrence fundamentally seek to achieve successful long-term 
defense by shaping the future actions of potential adversaries, 
including actions that might not occur for many years into the 
future. In terms of goals, the distinction between the two approaches 
is not sharp and can easily become quite blurry. Patrick Morgan 
noted that deterrence theory’s central aim was to prevent an 
adversary from launching an attack,14 while an anonymous Bush 
Administration official remarked that one effect of declaring a 
 
 13. Jeff McMahan would press the connection even further, asserting that:  
[T]here is a clear sense in which all defen[s]e is preventive. One can defend oneself 
only against future harm. . . . One can, of course, defend oneself against the 
continuation of harm that is being caused by an attack in progress, but it is still only 
harm that one will otherwise suffer that one can defend oneself against. . . . It 
seems, indeed, a conceptual truth that successful defen[s]e consists in preventing 
harm from occurring.  
Jeff McMahan, Preventive War and the Killing of the Innocent, in THE ETHICS OF WAR: 
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 169, 172 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin 
eds., 2006). Although McMahan’s claim may be true in some narrow sense of “future,” that 
sense seems inappropriate to this debate. Even though military clashes extend through time, 
and thus some parts of a clash may be in the future relative to other parts of the same clash, 
when we reason about the justice and legality of the act of resorting to force at all—for 
example, address issues of jus ad bellum rather than jus in bello—we treat the resulting clash as 
a single complex entity, and measure past and future relative to it. The distinction between 
actions occurring within an ongoing conflict and actions that initiate a conflict is essential and 
longstanding, and not to be abandoned lightly. To be sure, determining the beginnings and 
ends of conflicts is notoriously often quite difficult, and important theoretical issues may arise 
from such puzzles. But for the issues at stake in this discussion, such metaphysical subtleties are 
a distraction. 
 14. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 13. 
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willingness to wage preventive war would be to produce “a deterrent 
element for the bad guys.”15 
D. Shared Dependence on Violence 
Deterrence and preventive war share another fundamental 
similarity: Both depend upon violence for the attainment of their 
prospective aims. Although preventive war’s reliance on violence is 
obvious, the way in which deterrence relies on violence can easily go 
unnoticed, since successful deterrence is “marked by nothing much 
happening.”16 Moreover, the history of deterrence theory offers an 
additional reason why the role of violence in deterrence has been 
easy to overlook. Modern deterrence theory developed largely 
during the Cold War, in a strategic environment dominated by the 
presence of nuclear weapons.17 The apocalyptic destructive power of 
nuclear weapons had two relevant consequences. First, it made 
serious consideration of retaliation seem rather pointless—if nuclear 
deterrence failed, the potential retaliator was probably doomed 
anyway.18 In this respect, nuclear deterrence was a one-time-only 
tactic, albeit one that extended over several decades. Second, nuclear 
weapons’ overwhelming destructiveness offered a way to avoid 
credibility concerns. The weapons were so destructive that even a 
threat with relatively low credibility might still be enough to deter, 
since the consequences of guessing incorrectly were so dire as to 
make even minimally credible threats become frightening.19 
 
 15. Michael R. Gordon, Serving Notice of a New U.S., Poised to Hit First and Alone, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1. 
 16. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 25; see also COLIN S. GRAY, MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE 
DETERRENCE 1 (2003) (“[E]pisodes of successful deterrence are recorded as blanks in the 
pages of history books.”). 
 17. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 116 (“In all cases [deterrence] is about setting 
boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those 
boundaries. . . . During the cold war, this effort became focused on the superpower 
confrontation, dominated by nuclear deterrence, to the point where it sucked in all theory. 
The study of deterrence became synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the 
cold war.”). 
 18. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 19 (“Retaliation against a nuclear-armed state 
(or one of its allies) might set off a nuclear war and cancel the future—your society and state 
could disappear. There would be no point to retaliating to prevent future attacks.”). 
 19. Morgan describes one influential Cold War school of thought as having concluded 
that the credibility of the West’s nuclear deterrent was altogether not a concern: “A state with 
massive destructive capabilities primed and ready to go could not be dismissed as bluffing, 
discounted for lacking the will to retaliate, or counted on to avoid escalation, because an 
attacker making a mistake on this would be committing suicide.” Id. at 24. In a similar vein, 
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Those two features, however, were idiosyncratic to nuclear 
deterrence. Outside the special nuclear context, a willingness and 
ability to retaliate against aggression when deterrence fails is 
fundamental to an effective long-term general deterrence strategy.20 
Deterrence is a conditional threat—if you attack, you will be sorry—
and to be effective the threat must be both credible and daunting.21 
Establishing a threat’s credibility, however, is impossible if the 
threatener’s previous actions suggest that the threat is empty—for 
example, if the threatener had not retaliated in the past when 
deterrence failed. And, even if the threat is credible, if it does not 
include the possibility of retaliation, it often will be insufficiently 
daunting. Samuel Huntington notes that deterrence by defense 
alone would be insufficient to provide much security: “[A]s both 
logic and experience make clear, a purely denial strategy inherently is 
a much weaker deterrent than one which combines both denial and 
retaliation.”22 
 
Morgan explains how nuclear weapons short-circuited another standard question in 
implementing a deterrence strategy: “The key question became: how much harm would be 
unacceptable? . . . [N]uclear weapons made it relatively simple to prepare a level of harm—
destroying much or all of the enemy as a viable twentieth-century society—which was 
presumed to be unacceptable to any rational government.” Id. at 15. 
 20. Morgan has suggested that “[w]hile deterrence theory has always stressed retaliation 
capabilities, for most states general deterrence means having forces for a vigorous defense; they 
seldom rely on retaliation.” Id. at 87. That empirical observation, if borne out by actual data, 
would raise interesting questions about why deterrence practice has diverged so much from 
deterrence theory. However, Freedman has noted that empirical claims about deterrence, and 
especially about general deterrence, are by nature remarkably difficult to establish. FREEDMAN, 
supra note 7, at 43–47. And questions about retaliation are likely to be especially opaque to 
empirical analysis, since we would expect to see retaliation occur only when the deterrer really 
possessed both the capacity and the will to retaliate effectively. But in those cases, deterrence is 
especially unlikely to fail. Thus, opportunities to observe actual retaliation in response to failed 
deterrence are likely to be rare, leaving empirical analysts with a data set that is sparse at best. 
 21. Establishing the credibility of threats has been one of deterrence theory’s central 
concerns. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 15 (“Credibility quickly became one of the two 
central concerns and problems in the theory and practice of deterrence. (Stability was the 
other.)”). 
 22. Samuel P. Huntington, Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in 
Europe, 8 INT’L SECURITY 32, 37 (1984). Huntington distinguishes among three different 
ways that military forces can deter. Id. at 35–36. One way is to serve as a proxy for the real 
deterrent. Id. Huntington gives as an example the NATO garrison of West Berlin, a force that 
had no chance of stopping any determined Warsaw Pact assault but whose presence ensured 
that any such assault would risk a wider war with NATO. Id. at 36. Second, military forces may 
deter by being sufficiently powerful to thwart the aggressor’s plans, “forcing the aggressor to 
risk defeat in his effort or to pay additional costs for success.” Id. Finally, military forces “can 
deter by threatening retaliation against assets highly valued by the potential aggressor.” Id. 
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That weakness arises from deterrence’s need to convince 
adversaries that the expected value of any attack would be negative 
(or highly negative, if the potential adversary has low risk-
aversion)23—that is, from the need to affect potential adversaries’ 
perceptions either of the probability that an attack would fail or of 
the severity of the consequences if it did fail (or both). To see why 
retaliation is necessary to meet that need, we can consider the various 
sorts of threats that deterrence may need to forestall. 
Against raids—surprise attacks that were not intended to open a 
sustained military campaign—or against assistance for terrorist 
attacks, a deterrent that relied wholly on the deterrer’s ability to 
mount a vigorous defense would be wholly ineffective, since the 
aggressive act would be over before the defense had even managed 
to begin. 
Against more ambitious threats, such as invasions aimed at 
territorial conquest, defensive measures would presumably have a 
chance at least to come into play. But even against threats of 
territorial conquest there are several significant problems for 
deterrence by defense alone. 
First, the adversary may be ignorant of the aspiring deterrer’s 
true defense capabilities and thus may be unaware that they are 
adequate to make an attack unattractive. In the real world, accurate 
intelligence about adversaries’ true capabilities and intentions is 
notoriously difficult to acquire.24 The possibility of retaliation, 
 
 23. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 44 (“[I]t is clear that the conception of 
deterrence concerns an effort to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that 
in the attacker’s cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not an attack.”) (emphasis omitted). 
Note that my characterization of deterrence’s task is slightly oversimplified, because under 
certain circumstances a state that is contemplating aggression may be deterred even if the 
expected value of the attack is not negative, provided merely that the expected value is low 
enough to be less than the expected value of other available alternatives. However, since 
general deterrence requires deterring a wide range of adversaries over a long period of time in 
many different circumstances, and since information about the alternatives contemplated by 
those adversaries and the subjective values they place upon them is very scarce under even the 
best of circumstances, in practice there is no hope of being able to tailor deterrent threats so 
nicely. The best that one can do is assume that everyone to be deterred will always have at least 
one alternative—namely, not attacking—which has an expected value of at least zero, and then 
construct one’s deterrent to ensure that attacking would have an expected value of less than 
zero. 
 24. Defective intelligence regarding a potential opponent’s capabilities and resolve can 
foster overoptimism in predicting the results of armed conflict. Geoffrey Blainey has 
emphasized the role of such overoptimism as a cause of war. GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES 
OF WAR 53 (“Why did nations turn so often to war in the belief that it was a sharp and quick 
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however, provides a margin of safety by increasing the potential costs 
of an attack, thus mitigating the risk of an adversary’s misestimating 
the deterrent to be below the threshold at which an attack would 
seem attractive. 
Second, in the absence of the possibility of retaliation, a potential 
attacker could draw encouragement from knowing that it could 
maintain some control over the cost of the attack, since that control 
would both facilitate accurate estimation of that cost and provide a 
safety net in case the attack went poorly.25 Samuel Huntington noted 
the resulting problem for deterrence: 
For a prospective attacker, the major difference between denial and 
retaliation concerns the certainty and controllability of the costs he 
may incur. If faced simply with a denial deterrent, he can estimate 
how much effort he will have to make and what his probable losses 
will be in order to defeat the enemy forces and achieve his 
objective. He can then balance these costs against the gains he will 
achieve. . . . If, however, he is confronted with a retaliatory 
deterrent, he may well be able to secure the gains he wants with 
relatively little effort, but he does not know the total costs he will 
have to pay, and those costs are in large measure beyond his 
control. . . . Precisely this uncertainty and absence of control made 
 
instrument for shaping international affairs when again and again the instrument had proved to 
be blunt or unpredictable? This recurring optimism is a vital prelude to war. Anything which 
increases that optimism is a cause of war. Anything which dampens that optimism is a cause of 
peace.”); see also id. at 35–56. 
 25. In addition to the uncertainty inherent in uncontrolled risks, the lack of control 
itself may enhance the psychological effect of the deterrent. It is often said that people are 
more fearful of risks that they feel unable to control (for example, an airplane’s crashing) than 
of risks that they feel able to control (for example, an automobile’s crashing), even when the 
former is statistically smaller than the latter. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: 
THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 27 (2003) (“People 
underestimate risks they willingly take and overestimate risks in situations they can’t control. . . 
. Commercial airplanes are perceived as riskier than automobiles, because the controls are in 
someone else’s hands—even though they’re much safer per passenger mile.”); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 72 (2002) (“People 
find uncontrollable risks especially unacceptable. Automobile accidents may seem less 
troublesome than airline disasters partly for this reason.”). Empirical verification of this 
hypothesis seems rather thin, but one widely cited paper from 1987 does suggest some 
confirmation for the link between uncontrollability and fearsomeness, at least among non-
experts. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987). But see Jonathan 
Baron, John C. Hershey & Howard Kunreuther, Determinants of Priority for Risk Reduction: 
The Role of Worry, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 413, 424 tbl.VII (2000) (finding that 21% of survey 
respondents cited “Lack of personal control” as one reason for worrying about a risk factor, 
but also that 25% of respondents cited lack of control as a reason for not worrying about the 
risk factor). 
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the threat of retaliation a strong deterrent. If these problems of 
uncertainty and uncontrollability are eliminated or greatly reduced, 
the effectiveness of the deterrent is seriously weakened.26 
Nor is this concern purely theoretical. Lawrence Freedman offers 
an example from recent history: 
[Deterrence through denial during the cold war] was really about 
boosting conventional defenses on NATO’s central front so that 
Warsaw Pact armies could not penetrate into Western Europe even 
if they wanted to. Despite the obvious merits of such an  
approach, . . . it was always undermined by the cost that was 
expected to be involved in building NATO’s forces up to Warsaw 
Pact levels, and also because, while denial was more credible, it was 
not necessarily so hazardous for the Warsaw Pact. It might be 
tempted to probe and push its luck knowing that the worst that 
could happen was that it would not make much progress.27 
Third, even if the adversary accurately recognizes the capability 
of the deterrer’s defenses, the adversary may not be very risk-averse. 
Indeed, risk-loving “adventurers” are precisely the sort of 
troublemaking national leaders that may be most important to deter, 
since even a successful defense comes at a significant cost in lives and 
wealth. For deterrence to be successful against a risk-tolerant 
adversary, a deterrer may need to increase, in the eyes of the 
potential aggressor, the cost of an attack beyond the estimated cost 
of overcoming the defender’s defenses. That, again, is the role of 
retaliation. 
Finally, just as the adversary’s ignorance poses problems for 
deterrence by defense alone, so too can the deterrer’s ignorance be a 
problem. Because accurate intelligence is often scarce, nations 
seeking to deter aggressors may have difficulty assessing or even 
identifying potential adversaries. Thus, it may be impossible for a 
deterrer to know ex ante what amount of defense would be sufficient 
to deter. The solution to this problem is to leave open the door to ex 
post adjustment—that is, to retaliation, which can fill the deterrent 
gap. Deterrence by defense alone is relatively brittle, vulnerable to 
dramatic failures if the deterrer’s intelligence is inadequate. 
Deterrence that includes the possibility of retaliation is more resilient 
because it is more flexible, and thus relatively more reliable. 
 
 26. Huntington, supra note 22, at 37–38. 
 27. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 37–38.  
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In sum, since effective deterrence requires that the defender’s 
total deterrent response be large enough to make a potential 
attacker’s net expected gain from an attack be negative (or highly 
negative, if the adversary is not risk-averse), building up defenses will 
often not be sufficient unless those defensive measures are backed up 
by the threat of retaliation. 
E. Retrospective Disproportionality 
Although the importance of retaliation for an effective system of 
general deterrence is widely noted, less commonly appreciated is the 
extent to which this retaliation must be disproportionate to the 
attack that provoked the retaliation—that is, it must be retrospectively 
disproportionate. There are at least three reasons why this must be so. 
First, and most generally, the need for retrospectively 
disproportionate retaliation follows directly from deterrence’s central 
task, namely establishing or preserving the credibility of a threat that 
is sufficiently grave to dissuade future aggression. In order for such 
dissuasion to occur, the threat must be scaled to negate the 
advantage that the potential attacker would hope to gain by 
attacking, not merely be proportioned to the magnitude of the 
attack itself.28 The threatened retaliation would thus be prospectively 
proportionate but retrospectively disproportionate.29 
An example might be helpful. Suppose that A would benefit 
greatly if a military coup overthrows the government of B, and that 
A estimates that a surprise air attack that destroyed two of B’s 
military bases near the border between A and B would have a fifty 
percent chance of sparking such a coup. For simplicity’s sake, 
suppose that A is almost certain that it could successfully conduct 
such a surprise attack without significant losses of aircraft or pilots 
during the attack. What would deter A from launching the attack? 
 
 28. Cf. Robert Jervis, War and Misperception, 18 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 675, 678 (1988) 
(“A state may believe that the chances of victory are small and yet rationally decide to fight if 
the gains of victory are large and the costs of losing are not much greater than those of making 
the concessions necessary to avoid war.”). 
 29. See, for example, Freedman’s account of strategic deterrence: “B should be 
convinced that any aggressive moves will fail to prosper either because of A’s likely resistance 
or, even if they do prosper, because of retaliatory moves by A which will hurt B badly and far 
outweigh any prospective gains.” FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 27; see also Philip A. Seymour, 
The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool Against State-Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. 
REV. 221, 238 (1990) (“The extent of the original injury has little bearing on the amount of 
force necessary to coerce an offending state to refrain from further acts of aggression.”). 
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Since we have stipulated that the probability that the attack 
would successfully prompt a coup (50%) is identical to the 
probability that it would fail to do so (50%), the expected value of 
the attack would depend wholly upon the size of the potential gain if 
the attack succeeds and the size of the potential cost if the attack 
fails. Since A would benefit greatly from a coup, if B’s retaliation is 
limited to matching the size of A’s attack—in this case destroying 
two military bases—A may feel that because the potential gains from 
the attack are so great, the risk (or even certainty) of B’s retaliating is 
worth accepting. (The potential gains from the attack are much 
greater than the potential costs.) A therefore would not be deterred, 
and would launch its attack. In this case, the attack would have a 
negative expected value from A’s point of view only if B’s expected 
retaliation would not be limited to destroying two military bases, but 
rather would be considerably greater—that is, only if the retaliation 
was proportioned to the size of A’s hoped-for benefit rather than to 
the size of the attack itself. 
A second reason why deterrence, as a general strategy, requires 
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation is the need to be able to 
deter aggression by any one of many possible adversaries. If a state 
adopts deterrence as a general defensive strategy, its retaliation 
against aggressive acts will need to be sufficient to deter not only 
future attacks from that same adversary but also from other potential 
adversaries, including adversaries who may be currently unknown.30 
 
 30. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 
10 (2006) (“The classic theory of deterrence contemplates the state’s absorbing the first harm, 
apprehending its perpetrator, and then punishing him publicly and proportionally, so as to 
show potential future harmdoers that it does not pay to commit the harm.”). Note the 
inherent tension in Dershowitz’s remark: If by “proportionally” he means “retrospectively 
proportionally,” as is traditional in law-of-war contexts, then the retaliation may well be 
inadequate to “show potential future harmdoers that it does not pay to commit the harm.” 
Only retaliation that is prospectively proportionate to potential adversaries’ hoped-for net future 
gains would be sufficient. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 48 (“A may threaten B with 
retaliation if C is attacked. . . . With luck, D, E, and F have also been impressed and will adjust 
their expectations accordingly in their future dealings with both A and B.”); id. at 60–61 
(discussing third-party deterrence in analogous criminological contexts); GRAY, supra note 16, 
at 1 (“[D]eterrence may work most efficaciously when it can rely not upon the potency of 
explicit threats, but rather upon the fears of publicly undesignated deterees who are 
discouraged from taking action by their anticipation of the threats [sic] that adventurous 
behavior would bring down upon their heads.”). But see MORGAN, supra note 7, at 102 (“We 
lack compelling evidence that commitments are interdependent in this way. Case studies and 
statistical analyses find little evidence that states assess each other’s resolve on the basis of past 
actions vis-à-vis third parties, and only modest evidence that past actions vis-à-vis themselves 
shape images of others’ credibility. A deterrer’s reputation certainly is important, it’s just that 
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This is especially true if any of those other adversaries, or any alliance 
of them, is more powerful than the original attacker and thus might 
not be impressed if the deterrer demonstrates merely the will and 
ability to retaliate against lesser powers. The deterrer may therefore 
have to hit the original attacker harder in retaliation, not because of 
any act or characteristic of that particular attacker, but because of a 
threatening feature of unrelated third parties. The retaliation thus 
would necessarily be disproportionate to what the initial 
provocation, taken alone, would justify. It would be proportioned 
instead to the size of the feared future threat. 
Third, if we relax the assumption of rationality in a potential 
aggressor, the need for retrospectively disproportionate retaliation 
may be even greater. Insofar as deterrence is even possible against 
agents with limited rationality, the deterrent threats involved would 
presumably have to be especially large and credible to cut through 
the fog of irrationality that governed the potential aggressor’s 
decisions.31 
The amount of disproportionality involved in efforts to make 
deterrence effective may be quite large. Indeed, some of deterrence’s 
advocates unapologetically embrace even highly retrospectively 
disproportionate retaliation. 
For example, Bart Szewczyk argues that preventive war is 
unnecessary because the prospect of existentially disproportionate 
retaliation can deter even rogue states from providing weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists: “It is unlikely that future 
rogue states would engage in such a risky policy, which could 
jeopardize the existence of the state itself—or at least its 
 
(a) past actions don’t always shape it, (b) there is no consistently reliable source of reputation, 
and (c) reputation is not always crucial or even important. This makes it hard to use analysis of 
the credibility problem to design an effective deterrence or explain reliably what happens when 
one tries to deter.”). However, although empirical evidence on this matter would be highly 
useful, a lack of such evidence either for or against propositions about third-party deterrence 
tells us little, since such evidence, naturally hard to come by even for the easiest cases of 
deterrence, is likely to be even thinner for the inherently diffuse workings of third-party 
deterrence. 
 31. A situation in which the party to be deterred is partially or wholly irrational has 
structural similarities to a situation in which the deterring party cannot obtain adequate 
information about how the other party’s rational deliberations work. Morgan notes that during 
the Cold War, the latter situation led to the development of the ultimate in disproportionate 
deterrence—the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): “MAD was not based on a 
calibration of unacceptable damage. It was designed to cope with the inability of the US to 
know what it would actually take to deter.” MORGAN, supra note 7, at 30. 
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government.”32 Ian Shapiro echoes that sentiment in asserting that 
containment through deterrence is a sufficient response to Iran’s 
current nuclear ambitions: 
[Iran’s] tactics scarcely distinguish them from the Soviets, against 
whom containment was successfully practiced. In any case, Iran is 
no better positioned than was Iraq to deploy nuclear weapons for 
anything other than defensive purposes. Even in that case it would 
have to be a tactic of absolute last resort, since provoking a nuclear 
response from Israel or the United States would for all practical 
purposes leave them without a country.33 
Similarly, in the wake of 9/11, The New York Times editorialized 
against hasty abandonment of deterrence, which the Times described 
as “diplomatic parlance for a brutally simple idea: that an attack on 
the United States or one of its close allies will lead to a devastating 
military retaliation against the country responsible.”34 Indeed, the 
Times found this inherent disproportionality to be one of 
deterrence’s key attractions: 
One advantage of deterrence is that it induces responsible behavior 
by enemies as a matter of their own self-interest. Even dictators 
tend to put certain basic interests above all else—pre-eminently 
their survival in power, with their national territories and a 
functioning economy intact. Aggression becomes unattractive if the 
price is devastation at home and possible removal from power.35 
And during the presidential campaign of 2000, the pre-9/11 
incarnation of Condoleezza Rice—then foreign policy advisor to 
 
 32. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Pre-emption, Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and 
Historical Assessment, 18 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 119, 133–34 (2005). 
 33. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 67; see also id. at 68 (“An obvious reason for [Iran’s and 
Saddam Hussein’s] reluctance to sponsor terrorist attacks [against the United States] is the low 
probability of remaining undiscovered—subjecting the sponsoring regime to the same 
devastating retaliation as if they had mounted the attack themselves.”). This embrace of 
“devastating retaliation” stands in ironic contrast to Shapiro’s earlier assertion:   
An additional source of containment’s moral appeal derives from its affinity with the 
doctrine of just war, and particularly those parts of the doctrine that require force 
used always [sic] to be proportionate to the ends sought, and war always to be the 
strategy of last resort. . . . We need not delve into the doctrine’s ultimate basis, if it 
has one, to note that the policies flowing from containment do not contravene just 
war theory and might even be seen as embodying it.  
Id. at 52. 
 34. Editorial, supra note 5, at 24. 
 35. Id.  
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candidate Bush—said that “the first line of defense [against rogue 
states] should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they 
do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any 
attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.”36 
F. Implications of Retrospective Disproportionality 
This inherent reliance upon retrospectively disproportionate 
retaliation raises significant questions about the legal and moral 
superiority of general deterrence strategies over strategies that 
potentially involve recourse to preventive war, and similar questions 
about deterrence-based strategies such as containment and power 
balancing. Later Parts of this Article will examine important details of 
those questions, but we can now sketch the basic concern that 
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation raises, especially in the 
extreme forms advocated for dealing with rogue states. 
The fundamental problem is that retrospective proportionality is 
commonly considered a necessary condition for a use of force to be 
legitimate. For example, Michael Walzer, echoing traditional “just 
war” requirements, explicitly includes retrospective proportionality 
among the three conditions necessary for deterrent retaliation (which 
he terms “peacetime reprisal”) to be morally permissible. Such 
reprisals, he says, “are [morally] governed, after the rule of 
noncombatant immunity, by the rule of backward-looking 
proportionality. Though life cannot be balanced against life, the 
second raid must be similar in character and scope to the first.”37 
And one might think of categorical prohibitions of preventive war as 
merely specific instances of a general rule requiring retrospective 
proportionality: Since there was no initial provocation to which 
preventive war responds, the retrospectively proportionate use of 
force in such cases would be zero use of force.38 
 
 36. Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 45, 61. 
 37. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 218 (4th ed. 2006). Walzer takes himself to be establishing a 
moral framework within which peacetime reprisals may occur, but in light of the inherent role 
that retrospectively disproportionate retaliation plays in deterrence as a systematic security 
strategy, his proportionality requirements call into question the legitimacy of any such system. 
Walzer unfortunately provides no argument to explain why these particular requirements are 
either necessary or jointly sufficient to make deterrent retaliation permissible. 
 38. Parts III and IV discuss the proportionality requirement in greater depth. 
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The more extreme forms of deterrent retaliation mentioned 
earlier raise the proportionality problem in especially stark fashion. 
Whether such retaliation could ever be morally justifiable is a 
question beyond the scope of this Article, and a question already 
discussed at length in Cold War debates about nuclear retaliation. It 
is worth noting, however, that the justifiability of such retaliation is 
at least not obvious. Moreover, risking the occurrence of a situation 
that would require a massively lethal retaliatory response may not be 
obviously superior to launching a far smaller and less deadly 
preventive attack to stop the situation from arising in the first place.39 
More important for present purposes, however, is to note that the 
proportionality concern is not limited to these spectacular instances 
of massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation. Although the examples are 
less dramatic when one steps back from Cold War-style deterrent 
situations to situations involving lesser levels of retaliation, the basic 
proportionality concern remains.  
G. Permitting the Threat, Prohibiting the Act? 
One cannot sidestep this difficulty by asserting that general 
deterrence never requires actually engaging in retrospectively 
disproportionate retaliation, but only threatening to do so. That 
evasion might have been possible in the context of Cold War nuclear 
deterrence, where any failure of deterrence would have eliminated 
the failed deterrer, and thus made moot any questions of deterring 
future adversaries. But that was a special case. More generally, if 
deterrence is to be an element of a lasting security strategy (such as 
containment) or global security system (such as a balance of power), 
 
 39. Using deterrence through threats of massive retaliation to stop WMD threats may 
seem intuitive to strategists conditioned by the “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) 
framework of the Cold War to think of delivering apocalyptic responses—or at least 
threatening to deliver apocalyptic responses—as the normal way of dealing with WMD threats. 
But even if such an approach made moral sense during the Cold War, the reason that it did was 
because there seemed to be no available alternative other than simple capitulation. Today, 
however, now that MAD is no longer the dominant context for strategic choices, there is at 
least one alternative—preventive war. Thus, there is a genuine question about the legal and 
moral propriety of embracing a system that would choose to rely upon a willingness to wreak 
horrific levels of destruction on innocent and often captive civilian populations when less 
horrific means seem to be available. Note also that if such retaliation would not be morally or 
legally permissible, that impermissibility could itself have strategic consequences by 
undermining the credibility of the threat of such retaliation. And the weaker that deterrence is, 
the less plausible it is as an alternative to a system that under certain circumstances permits 
preventive war. 
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then it will have to be effective over many cycles of aggression and 
response. Maintaining that effectiveness without actual retaliation to 
preserve the credibility of deterrent threats is likely to be impossible. 
Moreover, if one cares about the global legal and moral 
framework for the use of force, a rule that permitted states to 
threaten to retaliate but prohibited them from actually following 
through on those threats would confront states with a dilemma. 
They could signal their adherence to the global legal and moral 
order, but only at the cost of stripping their threats of the credibility 
that is necessary for deterrence to be possible. Alternatively, they 
could preserve their deterrence capability by separating themselves 
from that global order, but only at a legal and moral cost both to 
themselves and to the order that their separation had undermined. 
Thus, a rule permitting only threats of retaliation, but not actual 
retaliation, would effectively declare that deterrence as a systematic 
strategy was simply incompatible with the law or morality, or both. 
Such an attempt to make deterrence palatable would therefore 
ultimately amount to a concession of its impermissibility.   
H. Implications and Roadmap 
It thus begins to be clear that there is no legal and moral free 
ride for deterrence. Because of its inherent reliance on retrospectively 
disproportionate retaliation, deterrence—and any deterrence-based 
security system, such as containment or balance of power—rests on a 
foundation relevantly similar to preventive war.40 This similarity is 
essential, not accidental, because both approaches to security 
inherently involve the present use of violent force to diminish or 
eliminate merely potential threats. Both approaches require a 
willingness to “punish” a state for something that it has not yet done 
and may never do. And both necessarily involve retrospective 
disproportionality.  
So far, however, our discussion has been in general terms. The 
next Parts will explore the implications of deterrence and preventive 
war’s similarities in more detail by examining established legal and 
 
 40. For an especially clear acknowledgement of the similarity between deterrent 
retaliation and preventive war, see Robert W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The 
Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT’L. L. 586, 591 (1972) (“[W]hat appears as a reprisal when 
considered within the restricted context of the action in response to which the ‘retaliatory’ 
measure is taken, appears as self-defense—albeit, of an anticipatory nature—when considered 
within the broad context of a hostile relationship between states.”). 
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“just war” moral analyses of preventive war and deterrent retaliation. 
Part III focuses on legal issues arising out of specifics of the United 
Nations system. Part IV addresses broader “just war” arguments. 
III. LEGAL STATUS UNDER THE U.N. SYSTEM 
Under the United Nations (U.N.) system, a few compact 
principles establish the basic law governing the use of force. 
Although there is some controversy about the proper interpretation 
of those principles when applied to contentious issues such as 
preventive war, and although states and adjudicative bodies may not 
always follow those principles’ literal requirements, among those 
who do give those requirements great deference there is a general 
trend toward interpretations under which both preventive war and 
deterrent retaliation would be illegal. 
A. Operative Treaty Law and Judicial Interpretations 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter declares that “[a]ll Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”41 
Article 1 specifies those “Purposes,” two of which are relevant 
for our inquiry. The first purpose is “[t]o maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end: . . . to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes 
or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace,”42 and the 
second purpose is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace.”43 
These rules have two exceptions, which I shall turn to in a 
moment. But first note that if the exceptions do not apply, then 
Article 2(4) would, on its face, seem to prohibit both preventive war 
and deterrence as systematic strategies. The entire purpose of 
preventive war is to use force to change the political decisions of the 
 
 41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 42. Id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
 43. Id. at para. 2. 
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attacked state, whether by limiting its capacity to take undesirable 
future actions or by deposing the attacked regime altogether. And 
deterrence, even setting aside the use of force involved in deterrent 
retaliation, simply is the making of conditional threats to affect 
political decisions. Using these threats to constrain a potential 
adversary’s political independence is the very point of deterrence.44 
As Patrick Morgan puts it, “The essence of deterrence is that one 
party prevents another from doing something the first party does not 
want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does. This 
is the use of threats to manipulate behavior so that something 
unwanted does not occur . . . .”45 
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), in its Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, offered an interpretation of 
Article 2(4) that might seem somewhat friendlier to the legality of 
deterrence, at least in individual instances, than a literal reading of 
Article 2(4) is: 
Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is 
or is not a “threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter 
depends upon various factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself 
unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited 
under Article 2, paragraph 4. . . . The notions of “threat” and 
“use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand 
together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is 
illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such force will 
likewise be illegal.46  
However, the I.C.J.’s opinion also endorsed the court’s previous 
affirmation, in the Nicaragua case, that it is “well established in 
 
 44. Michael Doyle has noted that deterrence aims to affect the political independence of 
foreign states only to the extent that what the foreign state might choose to do would be 
illegal—i.e., what the foreign state is being deprived of the political independence to do is 
something that it had no legal right to do anyway. Letter from Michael Doyle to Brian Angelo 
Lee (Sept. 2007) (on file with author). However, one could say much the same about 
preventive war—it aims to preempt an attack that the target country would have had no legal 
right to launch. 
 45. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 1; see also GRAY, supra note 16, at 13 (“There is an 
obvious and undeniable sense in which [a deteree’s] decision [whether or not to be deterred] 
is made in a context of coercion, but still the intended deteree is at liberty to refuse to allow his 
policy to be controlled by foreign menaces.”); Robert L. Jervis, The Confrontation Between 
Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 
315, 320 (2003) (describing deterrence as a form of “coercion”). 
 46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 246 (July 8). 
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customary international law” that “self-defence would warrant only 
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary 
to respond to it.”47 Thus, deterrence’s essential reliance on the 
threat, and sometimes the actuality, of retrospectively 
disproportionate retaliation would still bring deterrence into conflict 
with Article 2(4)—if that article stood alone. 
The U.N. Charter, however, includes two important exceptions 
to its generally pacific provisions. First, the Charter authorizes the 
U.N. Security Council to undertake collective action “to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”48 Second, Article 51 makes 
a limited allowance for unilateral use of force in self-defense: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”49 The collective-action provision is not relevant to our 
inquiry, but the provision about the inherent right of self-defense is 
quite relevant. Indeed, interpreting the scope of Article 51’s self-
defense exception is the pivotal issue in determining the legality of 
preventive war and of deterrent retaliation.  
B. Elaboration in Case Law and the General Assembly 
Two oft-cited U.N. General Assembly resolutions, although 
nonbinding, are at least prima facie relevant to this interpretive issue. 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 reiterated that “[e]very State has 
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the 
existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of 
solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and 
problems concerning frontiers of States,” and declared that “[s]tates 
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of 
force.”50 Both preventive war and deterrent retaliation are contrary 
to this resolution.  
General Assembly Resolution 3314 set forth a very expansive 
understanding of what constitutes the crime of “aggression.” 
 
 47. Id. at 245 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 94 (June 27)). 
 48. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 49. Id. at art. 51. 
 50. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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“Aggression” was to include, inter alia, “invasion or attack by the 
armed forces of a State of the territory of another State,”51 the “use 
of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State,”52 
and “[a]n attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State.”53 If read literally, 
this very broad language would entail that even use of force in 
garden-variety self-defense could sometimes constitute “aggression,” 
and this language seems to prohibit both preventive war and 
deterrent retaliation. But the resolution has a saving clause: 
“Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way 
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its 
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”54 
Thus, in the end, Resolution 3314 provides little help in 
determining the proper interpretation of the scope of Article 51, 
since the resolution merely incorporates that interpretation, whatever 
it may be.  
A handful of I.C.J. cases offer some interpretive guidance. The 
Corfu Channel Case involved a dispute over damage suffered by 
British warships that struck mines in Albanian waters while legally 
exercising their right to travel through straits used for international 
navigation.55 The I.C.J. held Albania liable for that damage but also 
concluded that Britain’s subsequent removal of the mines from those 
straits illegally violated Albania’s territorial sovereignty. Although 
removing the mines was remediation, and thus presumably easier to 
justify legally than retaliation would have been, the court still 
rejected its legality:  
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further 
classified “Operation Retail” among methods of self-protection or 
self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between 
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential 
foundation of international relations. . . . [T]o ensure respect for 
international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare 
that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of 
Albanian sovereignty.56 
 
 51. G.A. Res. 3314, Annex, art. 3(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 52. Id. at art. 3(b). 
 53. Id. at art. 3(d). 
 54. Id. at art. 6. 
 55. The Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 56. Id. at 35. 
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In the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. addressed the legality of the 
United States’ support for armed Nicaraguan rebels.57 The court 
explicitly set aside the question of the legality of preemptive strikes in 
anticipation of imminent attacks,58 but stated that “the exercise of 
[the right of individual self-defence] is subject to the State concerned 
having been the victim of an armed attack.”59 The court further 
asserted the illegality of using coercion to affect a state’s foreign 
policy: 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State 
sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a 
political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of 
coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. 
The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very 
essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the 
case of an intervention which uses force . . . .60 
Taken alone, this condemnation would seem to imply the 
illegality of both preventive war and deterrent retaliation.61 However, 
the I.C.J. took some pains to state that Article 51’s exception for the 
“inherent” right of self-defense indicates that the Charter does not 
wholly supersede customary international law, and thus that certain 
actions permissible under customary law may still be permissible 
under the Charter.62 Even if this controversial claim is accepted as 
true, the Nicaragua court’s affirmation of the proportionality 
requirement implies that retrospectively disproportionate deterrent 
retaliation, not to mention preventive war, would be illegal. 
C. Academic Interpretations 
Yoram Dinstein asserts that deterrent retaliation—“armed 
reprisals” in his terminology—“can be a permissible form of self-
defence (in response to armed attack) under Article 51” but 
 
 57. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 58. Id. at 103. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 108. 
 61. The court also cited General Assembly Resolution 2625’s condemnation of reprisals. 
Id. at 101. 
 62. Id. at 94. 
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concedes that “most writers” disagree.63 Dinstein’s argument is 
largely consequentialist, reasoning that since a full-blown war of self-
defense is permissible under Article 51, a fortiori the lesser use of 
force involved in reprisal ought also to be permissible: 
It would be incomprehensible for war to be acknowledged—as it 
is—as a legitimate form of self-defense in response to an isolated 
armed attack, if defensive armed reprisals were inadmissible. Taking 
into account that Article 51 allows maximal use of counter-force 
(war) in self-defence, there is every reason for a more calibrated 
form of counter-force (defensive armed reprisals) to be legitimate 
as well.64 
This argument, however, is unconvincing since Article 51 
permits the waging of defensive war only until the U.N. Security 
Council has had time to act. As Dinstein himself acknowledges, 
reprisals, unlike defensive wars, occur only after the original 
provocation is complete, so immediate execution of the reprisal is 
not of great urgency.65 A state that fights a defensive war is forced 
into combat as soon as the aggressor attacks, but a state that intends 
to launch an armed reprisal can afford to wait for Security Council 
approval. Thus, the most plausible reading of Article 51 would seem 
to be that deterrent retaliation is permissible only if the Security 
Council has authorized it.  
Moreover, Dinstein acknowledges the continued importance of 
proportionality: “As in other circumstances in which self-defense is 
invoked, defensive armed reprisals must meet the conditions of 
necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Proportionality is the 
quintessential factor in appraising the legitimacy of the counter-
measures executed by the responding State.”66 Although at one 
point Dinstein suggests a potentially permissive and vague definition 
of “proportional” as equivalent to “reasonable,”67 he later 
acknowledges that retrospective proportionality is what is required: 
“[T]he responding State must adapt the magnitude of its counter-
 
 63. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 198 (3d ed. 2001). 
 64. Id. at 201. 
 65. Id. at 200 (referring to “the built-in time-lag between the original armed attack and 
the response of the victim State, which is an inevitable feature in all armed reprisals”). 
 66. Id. at 197. 
 67. Id. at 184 (“It is perhaps best to consider the demand for proportionality in the 
province of self-defense as a standard of reasonableness in the response to force by counter-
force.”). 
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measures to the ‘scale and effects’ of the armed attack. A calculus of 
force, introducing some symmetry or approximation between the 
dimensions of the lawful counter-force and the original (unlawful) 
use of force, is imperative.”68 
Thus, given the essential dependence of deterrence on 
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation, Dinstein’s defense of the 
legality of armed reprisals under Article 51 becomes untenable. The 
only permissible reprisals under his reading would be retrospectively 
proportionate reprisals, that is, reprisals of a sort that would be 
ineffective in maintaining general deterrence. 
Mary Ellen O’Connell asserts, on the basis of General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 and Corfu Channel, that use of force for “general 
deterrence” is legally prohibited unless authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council.69 She also asserts that preventive war “is clearly 
unlawful under international law,” since “[a]rmed action in self-
defense is permitted only against armed attack.”70 
The most interesting part of O’Connell’s analysis arises when she 
turns to the question of how broadly to interpret Article 51’s 
exception for the “inherent” right of self-defense, and specifically 
whether that exception implies that states still are permitted to 
exercise the rights of self-defense that they have under customary 
international law. O’Connell argues that it does not—that the proper 
interpretation of the exception is quite narrow. O’Connell’s main 
reason for reaching that conclusion is historical and textual: 
The UN Charter was adopted for the very purpose of creating a far 
wider prohibition on force than existed under treaty or custom in 
1945 . . . . Even if earlier custom allowed [preventive] self-defense, 
arguing that it persisted after 1945 for UN members requires 
privileging the word “inherent” over the plain terms of Article 2(4) 
and the words “armed attack” in Article 51.71 
Intuitively, this conclusion seems plausible, but the argument seems 
fundamentally incomplete. 
First, someone might argue that the purpose of the U.N. Charter 
was to create a wider prohibition on the use of aggressive force, not 
 
 68. Id. at 198. 
 69. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L 
LAW TASK FORCE PAPERS 1, 6 (2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 2–3. 
 71. Id. at 13. O’Connell’s terminology differs slightly from mine. What I have been 
calling “preventive,” she refers to as “preemptive.” 
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to create a wider prohibition on the use of force even in self-defense, 
especially when doing so would lead to less violence overall. (Recall 
that the General Assembly’s broad definition of “aggression” is non-
binding and did not appear until years after ratification of the 
Charter.) 
O’Connell’s textual argument—that the broad understanding of 
“inherent” improperly privileges part of Article 51 over the plain 
terms of Article 2(4)—is no genuine objection. Since Article 51 is 
explicitly an exception to Article 2(4), Article 51’s language 
necessarily has priority over Article 2(4)’s. Moreover, it is not clear 
why privileging the word “inherent” in Article 51 over the words 
“armed attack” in that same article is any more objectionable than 
what O’Connell advocates, which is to privilege “armed attack” over 
“inherent.” At best, which of those two terms should take priority 
seems indeterminate. 
Here Dinstein’s argument for the same conclusion seems more 
telling: The language of Article 51 would be quite perplexing if its 
drafters had intended to allow states to continue to exercise a 
customary international law right to resort to preventive war: “What 
is the point in stating the obvious (i.e., that an armed attack gives 
rise to the right of self-defence), while omitting a reference to the 
ambiguous conditions of preventive war?”72 
But another, more fundamental, response is potentially available 
to defenders of a broad understanding of “inherent.” O’Connell 
describes it briefly and rejects it:  
Some writers promoting the “inherent right” theory argue that the 
parameters of the right of self-defense are unchangeable by Charter 
text and subsequent state practice. Indeed some principles of 
international law are unchangeable, even by subsequent agreement 
or practice. These are the so-called jus cogens principles. But no 
authority has ever identified a unilateral right of anticipatory self-
defense as a jus cogens principle.73 
Even if no one has acknowledged such a principle (or a similar 
principle permitting retrospectively disproportionate deterrent 
retaliation) it still might be possible to construct an argument that 
 
 72. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 168. Again, note that parallel reasoning would also rule 
out retrospectively disproportionate deterrent retaliation. 
 73. O’Connell, supra note 69, at 13. O’Connell does not mention which writers she has 
in mind. 
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such a principle must exist. For example, Whitley Kaufman, in 
arguing for a conclusion similar to O’Connell’s, has advanced a 
contractualist argument. Kaufman suggests that establishment of the 
U.N. Charter moved the world from a state of nature, where 
traditional just war rules applied, to a condition of “civil society” 
governed by the U.N. as sovereign, and that the “social contract” 
requires states to “agree to submit disputes to a central authority and 
to abide by its decisions (even when they vehemently disagree).”74 
But if one takes this “social contract” notion seriously, the correct 
conclusion might be the exact opposite—that states retain a broad 
inherent right of self-defense no matter what language is in the 
Charter. 
If a social contract is what creates “civil society” at the 
international level, presumably a social contract is also what creates 
“civil society” at the national level. Thus, international “civil society” 
would be the product of a contract among entities (states) which are 
themselves the products of social contracts. So one would expect 
that the authority of those component states would not be 
unlimited—there are certain concessions that the individuals who 
contracted to provide that authority would not have made. For 
example, individuals would be unlikely to contract to create a state 
with the authority to enter a treaty that sold the state’s population 
into slavery. So no such treaty provisions could be binding, even if 
the relevant governments observed all the formalities in creating that 
“treaty”—those governments would necessarily have lacked the 
authority to accept such provisions. The crucial question then 
becomes whether individuals entering a social contract would have 
agreed to give their states the authority to relinquish the customary 
right of preventive self-defense (or of retrospectively 
disproportionate deterrent retaliation) in exchange for the protection 
of the U.N. as global sovereign. 
The answer to that question seems to hinge on how effective 
those individuals would expect the U.N. to be at enforcing peaceable 
relations. And the establishment of veto-wielding permanent 
members of the Security Council, not to mention all of the U.N.’s 
other institutional constraints, arguably made inevitable the U.N.’s 
sadly dismal record as guarantor of world peace. As a result, from a 
 
 74. Whitley Kaufman, What’s Wrong with Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for 
the Preventive Use of Force, ETHICS & INT’L AFF., Dec. 2005, at 32, 37. 
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contractualist point of view, there is at least a prima facie plausible 
argument that Article 51 cannot be read as depriving states of their 
former rights of self-defense, because no state would have had the 
authority to consent to such a term in a “social contract.” 
Nor does this conclusion necessarily require contractualist 
premises. For example, one might argue that a “civil society” of the 
sort that Kaufman describes is something that those who drafted the 
Charter did indeed attempt to create, but that their attempt failed: 
The U.N. never actually became a global sovereign. As recent events 
abroad remind us, creating a genuine civil society requires 
considerably more than drafting a constitution and declaring success. 
Alternatively, one may argue that the right to defend oneself as 
effectively as possible against mortal threats is an inalienable “natural 
right,”75 or that states have a natural law duty to protect their citizens 
and thus necessarily lack the authority to cede the rights of self-
defense necessary to fulfill that duty.76 
Of course, such arguments involve complex and profound issues, 
and assessing their merits is far beyond the scope of this Article. For 
present purposes, it is enough to note their possibility and three 
consequences of our discussion: First, the legal statuses of deterrent 
retaliation and of preventive war are likely to be similar. Second, 
what those statuses are will depend upon the proper interpretation of 
the scope of Article 51. And, third, simple textual or historical 
analysis may not be enough to determine the legal permissibility of 
deterrence and preventive war. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY “JUST WAR” ARGUMENTS 
Our discussion so far has focused on the U.N. Charter system. 
Different questions arise when we consider more general debates 
about the requirements of “just war” theory. 
 
 75. This sort of idea may lie behind Burton Leiser’s argument that “[c]onditions being 
what they are, there can be no blanket moral or legal condemnation of reprisals. Some reprisals 
must be permissible, for without the right to resort to them, peace-loving nations would be at 
the mercy of those who are more inclined to engage in international outlawry.” Burton M. 
Leiser, The Morality of Reprisals, 85 ETHICS 159, 163 (1975). 
 76. For the notion of a state’s natural law duty to protect its citizens, see, e.g., William 
C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of 
Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1426–36, 1450–53 (2004). 
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A. Non-Consequentialist Arguments 
Traditional just war criteria, which are often (although not 
necessarily) taken to be non-consequentialist principles, pose serious 
difficulties for preventive war. We have already seen the formidable 
difficulty that the traditional just war requirement of retrospective 
proportionality poses for deterrence and, a fortiori, for preventive 
war. But an equally grave problem arises from the criterion 
designating who may legitimately be subject to attack. As Jeff 
McMahan notes, “Because in just war theory the criterion of liability 
to attack is actively posing a threat to others, it is simply not possible 
for that theory to acknowledge the permissibility of any instance of 
preventive war.”77 Note that this same criterion would also rule out 
general deterrent retaliation in most instances (since the attack to be 
deterred would not yet be in the offing) and always to the extent 
that the retaliation is intended to deter third parties. Thus, general 
deterrence would be an impermissible security strategy. 
The implications of non-consequentialist jus in bello precepts 
about legitimate targets reinforce this conclusion. It is common to 
take jus in bello principles, principles about how to fight the wars that 
occur, to be conceptually and practically distinct from jus ad bellum 
principles, principles about when it is permissible to go to war in the 
first place. However, in the case of deterrent retaliation, those 
categories blur together. 
Michael Walzer has advanced a rights-based jus in bello criticism 
of belligerent reprisals (reprisals within an already existing war) when 
directed against civilians, prisoners of war, and other innocents—for 
example, against responding to an adversary’s massacre of prisoners 
of war by killing an equal number of the adversary’s soldiers who are 
now prisoners. Such belligerent reprisals, Walzer asserts, violate the 
rights of their innocent victims: “[T]he helplessness of the victims 
rules them out as objects of military attack, and their 
noninvolvement in criminal activity rules them out as objects of 
retributive violence.”78 David Rodin concurs, “[T]he innocent 
victims of reprisal have not violated anyone’s rights, and therefore 
retain full rights against being harmed for the purposes of 
deterrence. Reprisal is a case of punishing the innocent to deter the 
 
 77. McMahan, supra note 13, at 179. 
 78. WALZER, supra note 37, at 213–14. 
LEE.PP3 3/13/2009  9:19 AM 
253 Preventive War 
 283 
guilty. As such, it is reciprocal action directed at the wrong subjects 
. . . .”79 
Although introduced in a jus in bello context, such rights-based 
arguments naturally imply a straightforward jus ad bellum rejection 
both of what Walzer calls “peacetime reprisal”—that is, deterrent 
retaliation—and of preventive war.80 That conclusion is fairly obvious 
in cases of third-party deterrence—for example, cases in which B 
attacks A and then A amplifies its retaliation with an eye toward 
deterring not only B but also C and D. Because the residents of B 
who experience the resulting extra suffering bear no responsibility for 
what C or D may do, their rights are violated in being forced to pay 
the price nonetheless. 
Even if there are only two actors, A and B, if A’s launching a 
preventive attack against B to forestall something that B has not yet 
done would violate the rights of B’s residents, then A’s increasing its 
level of retaliation against B to deter attacks that B has not yet 
launched would seem to violate those residents’ rights just as much. 
To be sure, prior acts can forfeit rights, so B’s initial attack may 
forfeit its residents’ right to be immune from some violent response, 
but that is far from entailing that B’s residents have forfeited all 
immunity from any sort of attack—just as a criminal’s crime forfeits 
his right not to be imprisoned but does not make him morally liable 
for punishment for crimes that he has not yet committed. Absent 
such a restriction, any (non-consequentialist) retrospective propor-
tionality requirement would be a dead letter. 
So these standard rights-based accounts do not provide grounds 
for morally distinguishing preventive war from deterrent retaliation; 
the impermissibility of the one closely tracks the impermissibility of 
the other. 
B. Consequentialist Arguments—General Observations 
Consequentialist arguments provide a stronger prima facie case 
for the permissibility of deterrent retaliation, but also for the 
permissibility of preventive war. A basic outline for an argument of 
this sort is easy to sketch: Since the violence and destructiveness of 
war are bad, states should, all else being equal, at least be allowed 
 
 79. David Rodin, The Ethics of Asymmetric War, in THE ETHICS OF WAR: SHARED 
PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 153, 163 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin eds., 2006). 
 80. WALZER, supra note 37, at 216–22. 
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(and perhaps even required) to take measures that lead to a smaller 
total amount of such violence and destructiveness. And since 
sometimes relatively small preventive actions or deterrent retaliation 
can forestall much larger and more destructive wars, states should 
therefore sometimes be allowed to engage in those actions of 
retaliation, if the total net consequences would be positive.81 
Of course, that sketch is much too simple, and any full 
development of a consequentialist argument in favor of either 
preventive war or deterrent retaliation would require considerable 
elaboration. However, the sketch is a sufficient backdrop for 
examining the current consequentialist literature, which typically has 
been skeptical of preventive war and thus has focused on arguing 
against its permissibility rather than for it. We shall once again see 
that the concerns raised about preventive war commonly apply with 
equal force to deterrent retaliation. 
Although these consequentialist criticisms vary in their details, 
they are typically variations on a common theme: Because of self-
interested human nature and the inherent limitations on human 
knowledge, permitting preventive war would have negative net total 
consequences by leading to the occurrence of too many wars. 
C. The Psychological Argument 
One consequentialist argument focuses on psychological issues. 
Jeff McMahan asserts that natural human partiality irremediably 
biases decisions in favor of going to war:  
Americans are not alone in thinking that whatever threats they face 
must be unjust, while any threats they pose must be just. For most 
citizens of most countries cherish the same patriotic delusions 
about their own country. And this means that, even if we could 
identify a plausible doctrine of preventive war that would specify 
the precise conditions in which such a war could be justified, the 
doctrine would be bound to be regularly misapplied.82 
Similarly, David Luban reworks Michael Walzer’s non-
consequentialist concern about making war too “ordinary” into a 
consequentialist concern about lowering psychic barriers to engaging 
in preventive war: Permitting preventive war would make war part of 
 
 81. For one version of a consequentialist argument in favor of preventive war see Luban, 
supra note 8, at 220–21. 
 82. McMahan, supra note 13, at 175. 
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politics as usual, by establishing that the trigger for war need not be 
a truly exceptional imminent threat—“the adversary’s unmistakable 
signal that it has crossed the line from diplomacy to force”—but 
rather only a “set of policy choices not much different in kind from 
those that states always make.”83 We therefore must ban preventive 
war because “it looks too much like aggressive war, and experience 
has taught that routinizing aggression costs too much blood and too 
much suffering.”84 
Luban’s argument that permitting preventive war would make 
war too ordinary might seem to establish a clear distinction between 
deterrent retaliation and preventive war, since deterrent retaliation 
requires at least a prior attack against which to retaliate. Thus there is 
a natural limitation on deterrent retaliation’s ordinariness, provided 
that the overall deterrence system is working well enough that 
provocative attacks are not themselves commonplace. 
However, there is an important respect in which deterrence’s 
essential dependence on deterrent retaliation makes state violence 
even more ordinary than a doctrine of preventive war does. 
Preventive war doctrines say only that launching a preventive war is 
permitted under certain circumstances in which future threats exist. 
Even when those circumstances arise, it is quite consistent with that 
doctrine for a state to choose not to launch a preventive attack, for 
any of a multitude of reasons. Deterrence theory, by contrast, 
requires deterrent retaliation in response to attacks when a future 
threat exists—otherwise the deterrence system breaks down. Thus 
deterrence theory makes the use of force a normal part of policy in a 
way that goes significantly beyond even the doctrine of preventive 
war. 
D. The Epistemic Argument 
A related concern is epistemic: Under the best of circumstances it 
is difficult to know what other parties may do in the future, and 
often it may be wholly impossible. Thus, when a state contemplates 
launching a preventive war, even if it sincerely believes that such a 
 
 83. Luban, supra note 8, at 224–25; see also WALZER, supra note 37, at 79 (asserting 
that consequentialist criteria for what constitutes a legitimately actionable threat are inadequate 
“not because the wars they generate are too frequent, but because they are too common in 
another sense: too ordinary. . . . They radically underestimate the importance of the shift from 
diplomacy to force.”). 
 84. Luban, supra note 8, at 225. 
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war would have a net positive result overall, it is quite possibly 
wrong. Michael Walzer finds in this sort of concern a reason to reject 
consequentialist analysis altogether: “Given the radical uncertainties 
of power politics, there probably is no practical way of making out 
that position—deciding when to fight and when not—on utilitarian 
principles.”85 
But even some consequentialists who would reject Walzer’s 
conclusion as too extreme nevertheless find this epistemic limitation 
to be compelling enough to require a prohibition on preventive war. 
Jeff McMahan concludes that “the fundamental objection to 
preventive defence and, by implication, preventive war is not that it 
necessarily targets the innocent, but that, in practice, matters of 
evidence and probability are virtually never such that the effort at 
justification can succeed.”86 Similarly, David Luban argues that 
allowing preventive war brings into play human judgment and its 
irrationalities. Even when acting in good faith, decision makers 
cannot adequately gauge the size of an unactualized threat, so risk-
aversion will lead those decision makers to launch too many wars.87 
The end result, critics agree, is that granting moral permissibility to 
preventive war would increase the frequency of wars and induce 
global instability. 
These underlying observations about human psychological and 
epistemic limitations clearly have some merit. As anyone who has 
observed the history of stock market speculation can attest, 
predicting the behavior of other agents in a competitive environment 
is extremely difficult even under very favorable conditions. Accurate 
prediction becomes only more difficult when we switch to 
international relations, and the stakes become incomparably higher. 
However, those very same limitations would affect decisions about 
deterrent retaliation as much as they affect decisions about preventive 
war. Citizens of country A are likely to overestimate their innocence 
in provoking B’s attack on A, and thus to overestimate the extent to 
which deterrent retaliation is necessary to keep B (or C or D) from 
launching a future attack. Moreover, the epistemic difficulties that A 
faces in predicting the future behavior of B, C, and D are the same 
whether A is making predictions for the purpose of deciding about 
 
 85. WALZER, supra note 37, at 77. 
 86. McMahan, supra note 13, at 185. 
 87. Luban, supra note 8, at 227. 
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deterrent retaliation or for the purpose of deciding about preventive 
war. Deterrent retaliation thus stands on epistemic ground that is no 
firmer than preventive war’s. 
E. The Symmetry Argument 
David Luban has argued that making prevention a universal 
principle available to any nation would lead to the absurd conclusion 
that attacks “by both states in any of the world’s hot spots” would 
be justified, as each acted to strike before it was struck.
 88 
However, this criticism evaporates once one notes (as Luban 
does in a footnote) that a rule specifically prohibiting preventive war 
would be only one of the “just war” limitations on states’ ability to 
use force in preventive attacks.89 Traditional jus ad bellum criteria still 
apply, including the requirement of necessity.90 Thus, even if 
preventive wars were not generically prohibited, adversary states in 
the world’s hot spots would still not be morally entitled to launch 
preventive attacks against their opponents unless those opponents 
were (or genuinely seemed to be) preparing an aggressive attack and 
unless preventive war was the only possible way to mitigate that 
threat effectively. If B’s justification for attacking A is that B needs to 
prevent an attack from A, and A’s reason for considering attacking B 
is because A in turn feels compelled to prevent an attack which it 
anticipates from B, then the appropriate thing for B to do is not to 
attack A, but rather to reassure A of B’s peaceful intentions. 
Preventive attack by B would be unnecessary and thus unjustified.91 
Thus, contrary to Luban, removing the prohibition against 
preventive war would not necessarily give Japan moral permission to 
attack North Korea preventively, nor give North Korea moral 
permission to attack Japan.92 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at n.35. 
 90. Although historically there have been non-consequentialist arguments for the 
existence of those criteria, consequentialist arguments to the same conclusion are also available. 
 91. Of course, such reassurances may fail, but then A’s attack would be tragically 
unjustified (because it is unnecessary), and if A’s ignorance or irrationality was propelling A 
toward attacking B despite B’s best efforts to defuse the situation, it is not obvious that justice 
or morality would always require that B refrain from protecting its population by anticipating 
A’s attack. 
 92. Luban’s Japan-North Korea example appears in Luban, supra note 8, at 227. His 
acknowledgment of the possible relevance of other moral rules appears in id. at 227 n.35. 
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F. The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy Argument 
Luban further argues that the doctrine of preventive war makes 
rival states become potential threats to each other (and thus creates 
genuine reasons for preventive attacks), because it permits each rival 
to attack another “based on risk calculations whose indeterminacy 
makes them inherently unpredictable by the adversary—and then it 
licenses attacks by both of them, because now they are potential 
threats to each other.”93 The idea is that permitting preventive wars 
would actually induce states to launch preventive wars, as each 
reciprocally anticipated an anticipatory attack by the other. 
However, just as in the symmetry argument, the continued 
applicability of the jus ad bellum requirement of necessity short-
circuits this problem. A blanket just war prohibition of preventive 
war will discourage states from creating such threats only to the 
extent that state behavior actually complies with just war restrictions, 
and if states do comply with those restrictions, then they will also 
comply with the necessity condition. Thus, rather than plan for a 
preventive attack to forestall their neighbor’s preventive attack, they 
will work to convince the neighbor of their peaceful intentions, 
either through unilateral actions or through formal agreements such 
as non-aggression treaties. 
Moreover, deterrence is little better than preventive war in this 
regard, since deterrent retaliation would be open to a similar 
criticism: Permitting retrospectively disproportionate deterrent 
retaliation might lead to cycles of escalating violence, as each party 
sought to deter the other from engaging in such retaliation in the 
future. But again the necessity requirement acts as a limiter: There 
would be no necessity for the party that launched the first attack to 
retaliate in order to avoid receiving deterrent retaliation in the 
future, since it could avoid future retaliation simply by refraining 
from launching aggressive attacks. 
Nor does instability provide a convincing ground for 
distinguishing between deterrent retaliation and preventive war, for 
at least two reasons. First, deterrent retaliation can itself be 
destabilizing, since, if unsuccessful in deterring the recipient of the 
retaliation, it could trigger counter-retaliation and even escalating 
counter-retaliation. 
 
 93. Id. at 227. 
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Second, the destabilizing effects of granting moral permission to 
some instances of preventive war should not be overstated. It bears 
repeating that granting moral permission to launch a given preventive 
war does not imply a moral compulsion to do so. Luban asserts that 
“in life-and-death games, the gap between ‘permitted’ and 
‘prudentially required’ thins to the vanishing point.”94 But one must 
be careful not to confuse moral and prudential reasons. Even in life-
and-death situations, the gap between morally permitted and 
prudentially required is often very large indeed. For example, even if 
the United States was morally permitted to lead an invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, many critics would nevertheless maintain that the United 
States was not prudentially required to do so—indeed that prudence 
dictated the opposite. And in light of what transpired after the 
invasion, the likelihood that the United States will launch more 
preventive wars in the foreseeable future seems sharply diminished, 
even if the United States would be morally permitted to do so. Thus, 
a system which granted a limited moral permission for preventive 
wars under certain circumstances would not necessarily open the 
floodgates to a destabilizing sea of preventive wars. The actual effect 
on global stability might be comparable to the effect of granting 
moral permission for retrospectively disproportionate deterrent 
retaliation. (And in each case the effect of granting or denying moral 
permission might be small. One need not be a thoroughgoing 
“realist” to suspect that moral rules about permissible uses of force 
are not ubiquitously determinative of state action.) 
Moreover, it is not certain that an increase in preventive wars 
would increase long-term global instability rather than decrease it. An 
increase in preventive wars would clearly increase short-term 
instability, but if those wars actually were successful in thwarting 
even larger threats, the net effect might actually be to decrease the 
total amount of international violence. Michael Walzer noted that 
historically preventive war has been tied to the maintenance of 
systems of balance of power,95 and we might think of such systems as 
accepting a higher frequency of small-scale instability in exchange for 
a lower risk of large-scale instability. Of course, if preventive wars are 
most often launched when prudentially unjustified (from the 
standpoint of total welfare), then we would indeed expect greater 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. WALZER, supra note 37, at 76–77. 
LEE.PP3 3/13/2009  9:19 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
290 
total instability from permitting such wars. But whether such 
prudentially unjustified preventive wars would be the norm is an 
empirical question which armchair theorizing, by either preventive 
war’s defenders or its critics, is inadequate to replace.
 
And since 
adequate empirical data seems unlikely to be available, the question 
remains open.96 
Thus, neither non-consequentialist nor consequentialist 
arguments, even to the extent that they are persuasive, provide 
grounds for finding any significant difference in the relative 
permissibility of deterrent retaliation and of preventive war. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that future-orientation and reliance on 
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation make general deterrence 
subject to many of the same fundamental objections that are raised 
against doctrines which permit preventive war. There are three 
possible responses to this situation. 
One might assert that deterrence clearly is permissible (both 
legally and morally), and therefore preventive war must also be 
permissible, at least sometimes. For someone who takes this 
approach, the main challenge will then be to identify an appropriate 
legal and moral framework within the current system to regulate, 
without prohibiting, unilateral recourse to preventive war. 
Alternatively, one might assert that preventive war is clearly 
impermissible (either legally or morally or both), and therefore 
retrospectively disproportionate deterrent retaliation, and thus 
general deterrence, must also be impermissible. 
Someone who took that approach then would have two options. 
One option is to conclude that the legal or moral rules that prohibit 
such use of force must therefore be incorrect and need to be 
changed. Michael Walzer, for example, has concluded that the 
current prohibition on preventive war needs modification and has 
 
 96. Randall Dipert asserts that computer simulations of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
indicate that preventive war does not ultimately lead to more wars and destruction. (He also 
asserts the existence of game-theoretic proofs of a similar result for deterrent retaliation.) 
Randall R. Dipert, Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War, 5 
J. MIL. ETHICS 32, 47–48 (2006). 
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proposed “a major revision of the legalist paradigm.”97 The principal 
challenge facing someone who takes this option is to set forth and 
justify what those revisions ought to be. 
The other option is to assert that we should take the current 
legal and moral rules as essentially unchangeable, and thus that states 
should refuse to use strategies involving preventive war or 
deterrence, no matter how costly that refusal may be. The main 
challenge for anyone who adopts this option is to identify some 
practically adequate permissible substitute for the strategies that they 
prohibit, strategies that form the foundation of the existing global 
security system. For without a reasonable substitute, the result of this 
prohibition might not be the marginalization of those disfavored 
strategies but rather the marginalization of the system of rules that 
prohibits them, and predation by the rule-disregarding upon the 
rule-abiding.98 
Which of these three responses is best is a question too large to 
be settled here. What is important for our purposes is to recognize 
that the question cannot be avoided. Common assumptions 
notwithstanding, deterrence, and strategies such as containment that 
depend on deterrence, are not legally and morally easy alternatives to 
preventive war. Rather, they are all close cousins, and we must be 
cautious about making a legal or moral judgment about one of 
them, unless we are willing to make that same judgment about the 
other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 97. WALZER, supra note 37, at 85. Walzer proposes adopting a rule along the lines of: 
“[S]tates may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so 
would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence.” Id. 
 98. Cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 201 (“Evidently, international law is created in the 
practice of States and not in scholarly writings. Even if clarity existed on the doctrinal level that 
a State ‘is not entitled to exercise a right of reprisal in modern international law’, this would 
merely serve ‘to discredit doctrinal approaches to legal analysis.’”) (quoting R.A. Falk, The 
Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 415, 430 (1969)). 
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